Carr, of Southampton, was found guilty of conspiracy to murder and was handed a life sentence. He will serve a minimum of 30 years in custody. Robertson's girlfriend, Lian Doyle, 24, of Hythe, earlier pleaded guilty to perverting the course of justice after she disposed of his shoes, it can now be reported. Mrs Davis, who had only recently married new husband Peter Davis, was alone in a small paddock in a field tending her horses when she was fatally stabbed.
The trial heard that Mrs Davis knew Carr because she had been in a relationship with his father Timothy from about to Prosecutor Richard Smith QC said Benjamin Carr harboured a "lasting hate and anger" towards Mrs Davis after she made a complaint to police about allegations of sexual assault against him when he was Mr Smith said police took no further action over the complaint and added that Carr "strenuously and consistently" denied the allegations.
But the accusations left Carr with a "lasting sense of animosity, hatred, towards Pennie Davis" which, according to prosecutors, didn't "wear off". Robertson, 36, of no fixed abode, had denied her murder and conspiracy to murder but was traced by police after he dropped a set of car keys at the murder scene. Winchester Crown Court heard that the murder victim was the partner of Carr's father, Timothy Carr, for six years.
Carr previously told the jury that he was the eldest of the children in the household which included Mrs Davis' five offspring. The defendant, who said he had dyslexia and ADHD, explained he had been attending a school for special educational needs but was taken out of formal education when they moved from the Southampton area to Chichester. He said that he fell out with Mrs Davis when she asked him when he was years-old to back up an allegation of rape and he refused.
The trial was held in Monroe County on a change of venue. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts and the Circuit Court sentenced Meeks to terms of life, thirty years, and ten years, respectively, on the capital murder, kidnapping and burglary charges, the sentences to be served consecutively.
The Court sentenced Meeks to six months in the Alcorn County jail for the assault charge, that sentence to run concurrently. Meeks argues the Circuit Court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict on Count II of the indictment, the charge that he kidnapped his estranged wife, Tana.
At the close of the case for the prosecution, Meeks moved that the Court direct a verdict of acquittal on the kidnapping count, citing the double jeopardy clauses of federal and state constitutions. The Circuit Court balked again and submitted the case to the jury, which found Meeks guilty of kidnapping.
Thereafter, Meeks moved for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, and that motion was denied as well.
The Circuit Court then imposed the thirty years sentence consecutive to two of his other sentences. Meeks says that the State of Mississippi has placed him twice in jeopardy for the kidnapping of his estranged wife, Tana.
Meeks reminds us that, not only was he convicted of capital murder, the offense of which the kidnapping of Tana Renee Meeks was a constituent part, he was thereafter subjected to a sentencing trial wherein the State sought the penalty of death.
To be sure, the jury unanimously decided to fix Meeks' sentence at life imprisonment. Meeks' present point is that he could never have been exposed to the death penalty had the jury not found him guilty, not only of the murder of Linda Meeks, but also the kidnapping of Tana Renee Meeks.
At the outset we note there is no offense to the constitution in the Circuit Court's putting Meeks to trial simultaneously on all counts and charges in the indictment. Ohio v. Johnson, U. We begin with the traditional homage to Blockburger, our most durable gloss on double jeopardy jurisprudence.
See Blockburger v. United States, U. Blockburger arose in the context of multiple punishments imposed for a single offense. It accepts that legislatures, federal there but state as well, are free to define crimes and prescribe punishments. See Upshaw v. State, So. Brame, Miss. It holds, however, that the courts may not impose for one de jure offense more than lawfully the prescribed punishment. See North Carolina v. Pearce, U. The Blockburger rule has particular application in the lesser included offense context.
If an individual is charged with two offenses, and all of the elements of one are included within and are a part of a second greater offense, Blockburger intervenes. It charges that we compare statutory offenses, as indicted, and see whether each requires proof of a fact which the other does not. The several prosecutions for capital murder and the burglary of Linda Meeks' home and the assault on Christopher Meeks pass muster under this standard.
See Brock v. On the other hand, where no further evidence is needed to establish the lesser offense, once the prosecution has proved the greater offense, punishment for the lesser is barred. Blockburger, U. See Grady v. Corbin, U. Vitale, U. Ohio, U. All of this fits the present point quite nicely. Code Ann. The jury gave life. Blockburger on its face pretermits an additional thirty years imprisonment for the self-same kidnapping.
Jones v. Thomas, U. We say this in the sense that the kidnapping was a constituent element of the capital murder charge. To be sure, Count I calls for more, proof of the kidnapping-plus, but nothing in Count II required that the prosecution prove a fact not necessary to Count I.
A case close to the mark, but for today's fact of concurrent and not subsequent prosecution, is Harris v. Oklahoma, U. In Harris, the defendant was convicted of felony-murder in Oklahoma. The underlying felony was robbery with firearms, proof of which provided the intent necessary for the felony murder conviction. The defendant was then brought to trial and convicted on a separate charge of robbery with firearms. He protested on the basis of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court held:.
Harris v. On today's indictment, Meeks could not have been found guilty of capital murder had he not been found guilty of kidnapping Tana. Whalen v. The accused raped and killed a woman in the District of Columbia. He was tried and convicted of first degree murder a felony murder offense proscribing killing in the course of committing certain enumerated felonies, including rape. As here, Whalen was simultaneously tried, convicted, and given a separate sentence, for the rape arising from the same incident.
For the murder, the trial court sentenced Whalen to imprisonment of twenty years to life. Separately, the court ordered that, consecutive to his service of his sentence for murder, Whalen serve fifteen years to life on his rape conviction. Whalen, U. Blockburger allows separate convictions and punishments only where each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
The prosecution would have us find our legislature has nonetheless provided separate offenses and separate consecutive punishments, citing Missouri v. We have carefully reviewed the statutes and find nothing of the sort.
Because parole eligibility is irrelevant to the issues at trial and is not a proper matter for the jury to consider in recommending punishment, we hold that the court properly refused to allow defense counsel to question potential jurors as to their knowledge about parole eligibility.
The Fifth Circuit noted on rehearing in King that "Texas policy follows that of the large majority of states and avowedly seeks to assist defendants by forbidding a jury to increase their punishment in anticipation of possible parole or clemency," and that to accept the defendant's contention would be contrary to that policy. We agree with that court that to "re-inject notions of parole eligibility at the forefront of the judicial proceedings," id. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by excusing three prospective jurors for cause due to their feelings about the death penalty without proper inquiry as to their ability to follow the law and by denying defendant the opportunity to question these prospective jurors. The first prospective juror challenged for cause indicated that she might not be able to vote for the death penalty under any circumstances.
The court questioned her:. Defendant argues that the excusal for cause of this prospective juror violated Wainwright v. Witt, U. Texas, U. The prospective juror here stated that she did not think that she could, under any circumstances, be part of a jury that sentenced someone to death. It is evident that her views on capital punishment impaired her ability to perform her duties as a juror in accordance with the trial court's instructions and with her oath.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing her for cause. The second prospective juror responded that he was opposed to the death penalty.
When asked whether his beliefs were so strong that he could not under any circumstances vote for the death penalty, he answered, "That's right. It is evident that these prospective jurors' views on capital punishment impaired their ability to perform their duties as jurors. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing them for cause. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him to question each of these prospective jurors before they were excused.
However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that any of these prospective jurors would have been rehabilitated by defendant.
Their answers to questions propounded by the prosecutor were unambiguous and indicated that they could not put aside their personal views and fulfill their duty according to North Carolina law. In State v. Reese, N. Oliver, N. Defendant has not made a showing that further questioning would have revealed different answers. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny further inquiry.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause of three prospective jurors. When the court denied defendant's challenges for cause of Ms. Moell and Mr. McLean, defendant used peremptory challenges to remove them.
Defendant contends that he had exhausted his fourteen peremptory challenges when the trial court refused to excuse Ms. Jones, and that he was improperly precluded from challenging her. The record reveals, however, that defendant only used thirteen of his fourteen peremptory challenges during jury voir dire, leaving one remaining peremptory challenge which he could have used to strike Ms. Sanders, N. Quesinberry, N. Because defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, he did not comply with the statute.
Therefore, he has not preserved his right to appeal on this issue. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu in portions of the prosecutor's closing argument. The arguments of counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge. Gladden, N. Counsel will be granted wide latitude in the argument of fiercely contested cases. Counsel may argue the law, the facts in evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.
Counsel may not refer to facts not in evidence or argue his or her own knowledge, beliefs and personal opinions not supported by the evidence. Because defendant did not object to the portions of the argument to which he now assigns error, "review is limited to an examination of whether the argument was so grossly improper that the trial [court] abused [its] discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu.
First, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that he "represented" the victim by saying, "Being a prosecutor is not always a pleasant task, for I speak, Mr.
Hobgood speaks for two dead ladies who can not speak. Maryland, U. There, the United States Supreme Court held that a sentencing jury must make its recommendation based on the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime and not on the personal characteristics of the victim.
The Supreme Court held that the use of a victim impact statement at the sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the Eighth Amendment. Here, unlike in Booth, the district attorney did not mention any of the personal characteristics of the victims, nor did he discuss the impact of their deaths on their families. Rather, he reminded the jury that he was an advocate for the two victims.
We do not find this argument so grossly improper that the court abused its discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu. Second, defendant claims that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he said about Ms. Stallings, "She's been stabbed. She's been stripped Obviously from this evidence she has been abused. She stands naked begging for her life and he needs a rifle to frighten her. There was evidence indicating that defendant had removed part of Ms.
Stallings' clothes before he shot her. McNeil testified that defendant took off Ms. Stallings' clothes after he had strangled her and that the strangling took place before Ms. McNeil went to get the rifle. The clothes, found in a pile on the floor, had very little blood on them, although there was much blood on the floor and the walls around the body.
The autopsy revealed that the victim had been stabbed and otherwise abused. LeGrand testified that several of the wounds, including the stab wound, the abdominal wound, and the wounds around the left eye, were inflicted before the victim died. Moreover, Ms. McNeil testified that when defendant started choking Ms.
Stallings, she said, "Please, y'all, don't hurt me. This argument was not so grossly improper as to require ex mero motu intervention by the trial court. Third, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly argued what the victim must have thought as she died.
The prosecutor said:. King, N. Likewise, the prosecutor's argument here was not so grossly improper as to require the court to intervene.
It was based on facts in evidence and on reasonable inferences from those facts. Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to submit as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that he was remorseful. When defense counsel requested this circumstance, the court asked what evidence showed remorse. Defense counsel responded that "the evidence of the confession shortly after the murders took place is evidence of the remorsefulness of the defendant. A trial court has no duty to instruct on a mitigating circumstance unless the record discloses evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the circumstance exists.
Wilson, N. We have examined defendant's confession and find no expression of remorse. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to submit remorse as a mitigating circumstance. Defendant argues, however, that his statement to the jury in the form of an allocution supports an instruction on this mitigating circumstance. After the court refused to submit defendant's remorse as a mitigating circumstance, and prior to the special prosecutor's closing argument to the jury, the court allowed defendant to address the jury.
Defendant stated:. Before the court charged the jury, defendant did not renew his request that the court submit remorse as a mitigating circumstance. After the court charged the jury, the court asked whether defendant had requests for additional instructions. Defense counsel responded that he did not. The trial court did not err in refusing to submit remorse as a mitigating circumstance based on defendant's statement that he was sorry for committing the crimes.
Defendant's statement to the jury was made in allocution. He was not under oath, nor was he subject to cross-examination. Therefore, the court had no duty to instruct on remorse.
See id. Defendant first argues that the prosecutor made assertions which were not supported by the evidence. The prosecutor commented on defendant's allocution as follows:. The prosecutor then said that the only appropriate sentence for defendant was death, and asked, "If you tell me we have not yet reached that point, then please tell me how many bodies it takes.
Is there some magic number? Is three not enough? We conclude that the prosecutor's argument was not so grossly improper that the court abused its discretion in failing to intervene ex mero motu. It was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on defendant's prior conviction of involuntary manslaughter, because that conviction was in evidence.
Further, the prosecutor's question, "Is three not enough? See State v. Holden, N. Finally, the prosecutor's address to the women on the jury was not so grossly improper as to require ex mero motu intervention. We held in Holden that the trial court properly sustained the State's objection to a part of the defense counsel's jury argument asking each juror individually to save the defendant's life.
However, here the prosecutor did not make a personal plea to each female juror; rather, he called them by name, then spoke to them collectively. Second, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to community sentiment in suggesting that only a death sentence would prevent this type of crime. We have upheld arguments by prosecutors suggesting to juries that they are the "voice and conscience of the community" and that they have an obligation to do something about serious crime.
Miller, N. Defendant argues, however, that State v. Scott, N. In Scott, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence and two other counts, all arising out of a fatal traffic accident. The prosecutor argued that "there's a lot of public sentiment at this point against driving and drinking, causing accidents on the highway. The State was improperly "asking the jury to lend an ear to the community rather than a voice. State, S. In the case now before us, the prosecutor asked the jury what message it would send to the community, not to "lend an ear to the community.
Rather, he reminded the jurors that they must decide the case on the evidence and the law. Therefore, his argument did not require ex mero motu intervention by the court. Third, defendant claims that the following argument by the prosecutor was grossly improper because it asked the jurors to set a standard for their community regarding the imposition of the death penalty:. Defendant argues that asking the jury to consider other cases in which death sentences have been imposed violates defendant's right to individualized sentencing in a capital case.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor tried to absolve the jurors of their responsibility for putting someone to death by telling them that if they returned a recommendation of the death sentence, defendant, not the jury, would be responsible for his execution. These arguments were not so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu.
The court also instructed the jurors that if they did not find the existence of this aggravating circumstance, then they should answer the circumstance "no" for both murders. Defendant argues that the court's instruction was an improper expression of opinion and that the jury would have understood the instruction to mean that the State had established this aggravating circumstance.
He argues that the instruction set up an irrebuttable presumption, lessening the State's burden of proving this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Because defendant did not object to this instruction at trial, he must show that the court committed plain error in giving the instruction.
Zuniga, N. The test is whether the alleged error had a probable impact on the verdict. McDougall, N. Here, the State introduced the record of defendant's prior conviction of the voluntary manslaughter of his former wife, Cynthia Latham McNeil.
Defendant did not offer evidence that the killing of his former wife did not involve the use of violence to the person. Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice and without premeditation and deliberation.
Barts, N. Voluntary manslaughter usuallyprobably alwaysinvolves violence to the person within the meaning and intent of N. In light of this, and of defendant's failure to offer evidence that the killing of his former wife did not involve violence to the person, we cannot conclude that the court's instruction that voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving the use of violence to the person amounted to plain error.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on this aggravating circumstance that "the first aggravating circumstance, if it applies at all, would under the evidence in this case apply in both cases.
Parrish, N. In Parrish we held that the trial court must instruct the jury to give separate consideration to cases of two codefendants being tried jointly for the same crime.
This case, however, involves one defendant on trial for two murders. The evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance that defendant had been convicted previously of a felony involving the use of violence to the person was identical in both cases. We find no plain error. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by submitting the aggravating circumstance that the murder of Ms. Stallings was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Vandiver, N. McNeil testified that defendant grabbed Ms. Stallings around the neck, pulled out a knife, and forced her into the bedroom. He demanded her food stamps, then choked her until she lost consciousness. Finally, he told Ms.
McNeil to get his rifle from next door, and when she did, he shot Ms. The evidence tends to show that defendant not only choked and shot the victim, but that he beat her, stabbed her, and hit her in the face with a wooden frame which had nails sticking out of it. There was also evidence tending to show that defendant pushed feces into her vagina.
This evidence is sufficient to show that the murder was excessively brutal and unnecessarily torturous to the victim. The trial court, therefore, did not err in submitting as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by submitting as an aggravating circumstance that each murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery.
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